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  Why do we think more of the United States (US) than the European Union (EU) 
when we discuss Afghani or Iraqi democratization, and EU more than US when it is East 
European? Should not democratization be the same? 
  A comparative study asks what democracy has historically meant in the two 
regions, how democratization has been spelled out, why instruments utilized differ, and 
where democracy lies in the broader global leadership context. Neither treats democracy 
as a vital interest, but differences abound: (a) While the US shifted from relative bottom-
up to top-down democracy, the EU added bottom-up to its top-down approach; (b) the 
US interprets democracy as the ends of other policy interests, the EU treats it as the 
means to other goals; and (c) flexible US instruments contrast with rigid EU counterparts. 
Among the implications: (a) the 4-stage US approach has wider global reach than EU’s 
multi-dimensional counterpart, but EU’s regional approach sinks deeper than the US’s; (b) 
human rights find better EU than US anchors; (c) whereas the US approach makes 
intergovernmental actions the sine qua non of democratization, the EU admixture of 
intergovernmentalism, transnationalism, and supranationalism, adapts quid pro quo 
dynamics, promotes incremental growth, and broadens democracy; and (d) competitive 
democratization patterns creates lock-ins for both recipient and supplier countries. 
 
  2Puzzle: 
 
Scanning the democratization map, why is the United States (US) behind the 
Afghani or Iraqi steering wheel and not the European Union (EU), and similarly why the 
EU behind East European’s efforts and not US? Neither the EU conveyed disinterest in 
democratizing Afghanistan and Iraq nor the US East European countries, but is the 
democratization formula the same? Must it be so?  
A first-cut response might point to geographical proximity pushing the EU more 
into East Europe than Afghanistan and Iraq, and strategic interests driving the US into 
Afghanistan and Iraq, much as they led the US into Germany and Japan after World War 
II. Different triggers conceivably produced dissimilar democratization formulas, but one 
might argue if democracy is the bottom-line in both, why worry, would not the end-
product be similar? Yet, by reassessing a critical assumption that EU and US have similar 
meanings of democracy, other pertinent questions arise: How do they go about the 
democratization processes? What instruments do they utilize? Where in the larger scheme 
of internal and international interests do they position democracy? 
Whether the EU and US have been on the same policy wavelength since the Cold 
War ended or not is a broader literary debate.
1 Much has been written about how they 
compete over trade policies and market access,
2 respond differently to environmental 
protection and human rights safeguards,
3 and take distinctive stands over, for example, the 
                                                 
1For a cautiously optimistic overview, see Roy H. Ginsberg, “U.S.-EU relations:the commercial, 
political, and security dimensions,” The State of the European Union, vol. 4: Deepening and Widening, eds. 
Peierre-Henri Laurent and Marc Maresceau (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 297-316.  
2A number of articles address these in Thomas L. Ilgen, ed., Hard power, Soft Power of 
transatlantic Relations (Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate,  2006);  
3For the orientational difference over the environment, see David G. Victor, The Collapse of the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, for 
the Council on Foreign Relations, 2001); and Heike Schröder, Negotiating the Kyoto Protocol: An Analysis 
of Negotiation Dynamics in International Negotiations (Münster, LIT Verlag, 2001).  
  3place and role of the United Nations or other organizational visions,
4 the need for regime-
change in defectively structured countries, the efficiency of collective action over 
individual state pursuits,
5 and increasingly over an area of enormous and successful past 
cooperation--the North American Treaty Organization (NATO).
6  Does democracy also 
show a transatlantic divergence? 
  Taking a stab at the transatlantic democratization puzzle, this study explores what 
democracy means on either side, how is it to be gotten, and where to place it among other 
state interests. Four sections address the definition of democracy, processes of 
democratization, the instruments of democratization, and placement of democracy in the 
larger sphere. Conclusions are drawn and implications projected thereafter. 
Meaning of Democracy: 
  Beginning with generic definitions, this section then traces how democracy 
evolved structurally on either side of the Atlantic. 
                                                 
4Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2006).  
5See the collection of articles in David M. Andrews, The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US-
European Relations After Iraq (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Christoph Bail, 
Wolfgang H. Reinicke, and Reinhardt Rummel, EU-US Relations: Balancing the Partnership: Taking a 
Medium-term Perspective (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verladsgesellschaft, 1997);Christina V. Balis and Simon 
Serfaty, eds., Visions of America and Europe: September 11, Iraq, and Transatlantic Relations 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004); Gustav E. Gustenau, Otmar Höll, 
and Thomas Nowotny, eds, Europe-USA: Diverging Partners (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgessellschaft, 
2006); Beatruice Heuser, Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideals and Costs (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1996); Sarwar A. Kashmeri, America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq: The Great 
Divide (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007); and Tod Lindberg, ed., Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, 
America and the Future of a Troubled Partnership (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005);  
6On the good, ’ole years, see Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago, 1962) also Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver’s Troubles or the Setting of American 
Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1968). On its post-Cold War difficulties, 
see Janusz Bugajski and Ilona Teleki, Atlantic Bridges: America’s New European Allies (Lanham, MD: 
Roman Littlefield, 2006); Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson, eds., Changing Transatlantic Relations: Do 
the US, the EU and Russia Form a New Strategic Triangle? (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006); Richard E. 
Rupp, NATO:After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline (Houndsmills, Basingtoke, Hampshire, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Stanley R. Sloan,  NATO and Transatlantic Relations in the 21
st Century: 
Crisis, Continuity or Change? Headline Series, #324 (New York, NY: Foreign Policy Association, Fall 
2002); and S. Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay, and Mark R. Rubin, NATO: After Fifty Years (Wilmington, DE: 
Scholarly Resources, 2001). 
  4Working Definition: 
 Stemming  from  demos and kratos, the Greek for people and rule, respectively, 
democracy represents a different form of governance but whose minimum qualifications 
still remain contentious. In his historical study of the two “comings” of democracy, John 
Dunn succinctly describes democracy as “a state in which sovereignty . . . is exercised by 
a council composed of the common multitude.”
7 Jack Plano and Milton Greenberg, in 
turn, distinguish between “direct and indirect democracy,”
8 while Philippe C. Schmitter 
and Terry Lynn Karl specify conditions of democracy. Among them: a regime or system 
of governance, a public realm of norms of choices, citizenship, competition, majority rule, 
cooperation, and representativeness.
9 From democracy’s second “coming,” beginning in 
the18th Century and spilling on to the 20
th Century, George Sørensen highlights the role 
of civil society, thus introducing the well-spring of more sublime and subtle wrinkles.
10
  As part and parcel of this second coming, John Stuart Mill and Joseph 
Schumpeter placed plural voting and people’s will--two relevant wrinkles--under the 
microscope. With plural voting, Mill argued, the vote of the “wiser and more talented” 
would become more useful than that of “the ignorant and less able,” even though the end-
goal of liberty is sought by both.
11 Schumpeter similarly challenged the notion of 
democracy in Dunn’s first coming, that is, in classical Greece, as representing “the will of 
the people” seeking “the common good,” when in practice it basically creates an 
“institutional arrangement” by which “individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
                                                 
7John Dunn, Democracy: A History (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2005), 66.  
8Jack Plano and Milton Greenberg, The American Political Dictionary (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1993, 9
th ed.), 8-9.  
9Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What democracy is . . . and is not,” Journal of 
Democracy 2, no. 3 (Summer 1991).  
10George Sørensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing 
World, Dilemma in World Politics Series (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 7.  
11From ibid.  
  5of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”
12 Levels of education, institutional 
capacities, and how power is translated can take the people’s will and the search for 
common goods in entirely different directions, breeding varieties of democracy. 
  Based on these extrapolations and nuances, Robert A. Dahl’s “rule of the many,” 
what he called polyarchy instead of democracy,
13 offers a widely respected political 
democracy framework of 3 opportunities, 8 institutional guarantees, and 3 dimensions.
14 
Citizens must have opportunities, he argues, to (a) formulate preferences; (b) convey 
these preferences publicly through individual and collective means; and (c) have those 
preferences considered by the government. These must be augmented by institutional 
guarantees to (a) form and join organizations freely: (b) express liberty; (c) vote; (d) be 
eligible for public office; (e) compete for support and vote by political leaders; (f) 
provide alternate sources of information; (g) have free and fair elections; and (h) make 
government policies depend on votes and other forms of expression. The emerging 
political democracy, he argues, permits (a) competition, (b) participation, and (c) civil 
and political liberties. In short, dahlian democracy features contestation and participation. 
Transatlantic Evolution: 
  Shifting from definitions to transatlantic playing fields shows how quite different 
democratic structures developed. On one shore emerged a more top-down democracy, on 
                                                 
12Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York, NY: Harper, 1947, 2
nd 
ed.), 269.  
13Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1971), ch. 1; also see his On Democracy (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1998); and the 
original, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1956).  
14By “widely respected,” I mean serving as the well-spring of theoretical formulations, as in 
Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), esp. 6-9; Sørensen, Democracy and Democratization, 11-6; Renske 
Doorenspleet, Democratic Transitions: Exploring the Structural Sources of the Fourth Wave (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998), 14-22; as well as Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, The Failure of Democratic 
Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution (Houndsmills, Basingtoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 28-9. The list is only partial.  
  6the other a relatively more bottom-up counterpart. Both top-down and bottom-up 
concepts expose hypothetically different dynamics and state structures: top-down reflects 
bourgeoisie interests and greater state centralization, bottom-up mass interests and 
decentralization.
15 Arguably at stake were land ownership and vested interests. The more 
the land belonged to the aristocrats, the more likely the route to democracy would be top-
down and the state centralized. Great Britain is the classic example.
16  Conversely, the 
more common people had access to land ownership, the more likely the route to 
democracy would show a bottom-up flavor, without fully becoming bottom-up, and 
greater respect for decentralized government. The United States fits this bill.
17 Similarly 
with vested interests: the longer land is owned, or a business is operated, the more vested 
the interests become; and contrariwise, the more recent land ownership or brevity of 
business enterprises, the less the vested interests. The deeper the cleavages, the higher the 
chances the society will be top-down, and likewise, the more shallow those cleavages, the 
more likelihood of a bottom-up orientation. 
  Alexis de Tocqueville, who noted several of these patterns during his 1831-32 US 
visit, left some rather striking US-European comparisons, or rather contrasts. He 
associated sovereignty, for example, with the people in the United States but with 
                                                 
15How both approaches are defined depends, in part, on the context. My usage here is similar to 
Paul G. Buchanan’s, with top-down representing “a gradual liberalization and political opening followed by 
competitive elections,” and bottom-up “when civil society mobilizes and expands the range of its demands 
while moving to secure a greater voice in the governmental decision making process.” See Buchanan, 
“From military rule in Argentina and Brazil,” Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, ed. Hans Binnendijk 
(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of 
State, 1987), 224, but see 223-33. Other definitions later in this paper is consistent with these. 
16Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and : Peasant in the 
Making of the Modern World (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966), ch. 1. 
17Ibid., ch. 3.  
  7monarchs and princes.
18 Since there was a lot of land to own in the US, people spread out, 
built townships and associations, and lived as if born-free of vested interests; by contrast, 
European land was limited, spoken for, and managed from the center by princes, nobles, 
or monarchs. With its bottom-up and decentralized structures and fewer vested interests, 
the United States contrasted the European top-down, centralized counterpart where 
vested interests were dense and deep. Exceptions, of course, exist: land-ownership was 
concentrated on too few a group originally in the United States, even creating an 
aristocracy, for example, in the southern states; while in Europe, England’s 16
th Century 
enclosure movement invited mass participation and democracy far ahead of bottom-up 
US,
19 and certainly continental Europe. One caricaturizes a stratified, and thereby socially 
more closed Europe, another a more horizontal, thus more socially open, US. 
  These distinctions matter today. Since citizenship carries the right to vote, 
immigrants acquire citizenship faster in the United States than they do in Europe. The 
European case is complicated by EU membership. Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
adopted European citizenship, European immigrants in other European countries cannot 
always get the right to vote or be elected. At the time of the treaty, only five countries 
permitted this (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden), seven did not 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg), while three lay in between 
(Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdon).
20 Only until very recently, blood was the only 
passport to German citizenship; but birth and naturalization have always been the US 
                                                 
18Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Richard D. Heffner (New York, NY: New 
American Library, 1956), part I, ch. 3.  
19On enclosures, see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture 
and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York, NY: Academic 
Press, 1974), 109-29. 
20Stefano Allievi, “Muslims and politics,” Muslims in the Enlarged Europe, eds. Brigitte Maréchal, 
Allievi, Felice Dassetto, and Jørgen Nielsen (Boston, MA: Brill, 2003), 184-5.  
  8counterparts. Even though Abraham Lincoln’s democracy “of the people, by the people, 
and for the people” was fulfilled several decades after his time when women got the right 
to vote in 1920 and Afro-Americans in 1964, US citizens can make stronger claims to 
Lincoln’s expectations than many Europeans can in their own country. 
  Even more relevant to the present study, since the US had elements of democracy 
from its very birth while European countries had to adapt various monarchies to 
democracy, it is quite ironic how the US is more a regime-change advocate today than the 
European countries. One of the triggers behind US-led democratization today is the need 
for regime-change, evident in Afghanistan and Iraq; yet when the European Community 
encouraged the East European democratization movements in the 1980s, we did not hear 
as much of regime-change trigger as the deployment of inter-governmental, transnational, 
and non-governmental agencies to fuel democracy-mindedness. 
  How democracy evolved on both sides of the Atlantic, then, demonstrates quite 
different adjustments, with class barriers spearheading the inclusion processes across 
stratified Europe and gender, race, as well as immigration the agents of making US 
democracy more representative. Whereas the slower European adjustment created more 
representative institutions, for example, the British House of Commons, the US 
adjustment proved more open to diversification--to include other groups.  
Process of Democratization: 
  To capture both different perspectives and various nuances, democratization is 
disaggregated into four strands: (a) meaning of democratization; (b) nation versus state-
building distinction; (c) functional levels of analysis; and (d) pathways in the literature. 
Meaning of Democratization:  
  9  Whereas the US initiates democratization through regime-change, European 
countries increasingly nurture ongoing democratic processes. In the relevant literatures, 
regime-change is treated under democratic transition, while democratic processes fall 
under consolidation. Democratization flows from both. 
  According to Huntington, democratization involves three broad tasks: (a) end the 
authoritarian regime; (b) install a democratic regime; and (c) consolidate the democratic 
regime.
21 Whereas the United States makes the first the necessary condition, European 
countries, through the EU, prioritize the third, believing regime-change can be induced 
through policy changes than military-driven regime-removal. Whereas US intervention 
knows no geographical boundaries, European democratic consolidation shows a rough 
geographically concentric pattern reflecting proximity: greater emphasis on neighboring 
countries than on distant ones. 
  Just from the meaning of the term, we find two very different orientations. 
Whereas force-usage changes the status quo in the US conceptualization, the EU 
counterpart threatens the status-quo less, and in fact, is willing to work within it. 
Similarly, the geographical open-ended US engagement differs from the proximity-driven 
EU meaning. Both these differences spell a third: the nuts and bolts of democratization 
may be less important to the US than to the EU, meaning by simply and officially 
changing the ideology suffices for the US but may not satisfy the EU. 
  Not to say similarities do not exist. Both believe the end-goal should not only be 
democracy, but also that democracy is implicitly a better and more efficient form of 
government. The US would not want a regime changed by democracy if democracy was 
not capable of offering a higher threshold of performances or satisfying interests better; 
                                                 
21Huntington, op. cit., 35.  
  10and the EU would not admit members unless a democratic government existed, capable 
of fulfilling the necessary policy adjustments. 
Nation versus State-building: Functional Identity 
  Neither nation-building nor state-building are new labels. Nation-building enjoys 
a long literary history reflecting the evolution of citizenship,
22 and particularly so in post-
World War II newly independent countries;
23 state-building also captures transitional 
countries,
24 whether shifting from conflict, colonialism, or authoritarianism. What is 
fascinating in reviving both terms is the explicit association with democratization, rather 
than leaving that connection implicit or as an assumption.
25 Among the implications: (a) 
the greater distinction between state and society; and (b) possible linkages between both, 
perhaps as stages toward democracy or in some sequential fashion. 
Francis Fukuyama’s distinctions between state-building and nation-building take 
us farther. Whereas state-building to him is concerned with “creating or strengthening 
such government institutions as armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-
collecting agencies, health and education systems, and the like,” nation-building 
prioritizes “creating or repairing all the cultural, social, and historical ties that bind 
people together as a nation.”
26 Returning to some prior discussions, state-building reflects 
                                                 
22See Reinhard Bendix, Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977).   
23Shawkat Ali, Nation Building, Development, and Administration: A Third World Perspective 
(Lahore: Aziz Brothers, 1979); and Henriette Riegler, ed., Nation Building: Between National Sovereignty 
and InternationalIntervention (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005);  
24 Volker Bornschier, State-Building in Europe: The Revitalization of Western European 
Integration (Cambridge, U: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Stefano Bianchini and George Schöpflin, 
State Building in the Balkans: Dilemmas on the Eve of the 21
st Century (Ravenna: Longo, 1998); and Su-
Hoon Lee, State-building in the Contemporary Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988). 
25For example, Francis Fukuyama, ed., Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).  
26Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-building 101,” The Atlantic Monthly (January-February 2004), 159-
62, from: http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/1/fukuyama.htm and -----, State-Building: Governance 
and Order in the 21
st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).  
  11top-down dynamics and nation-building bottom-up. With the US preferring the former 
and the EU emphasizing both, we notice another historical reversal: As the US itself 
became more bottom-up after extending voting rights, it increasingly advocated top-down 
democracy elsewhere; but the top-down European pattern, though not completely 
reversed, is certainly more diversified across Europe today than ever before. 
How do we explain these changes? One response is to distinguish between the 
domestic and external contexts, between domestic and foreign policy interests. The US 
was bottom-up only in comparison to the typical European state, but as soon as voting 
rights became more universal by the 1920s, exporting democracy climbed the policy-
making agenda ranks. Woodrow Wilson spoke of “making the world safe for democracy” 
almost as the suffragette movement entered its last protest lap before acquiring voting 
rights. Championing democracy abroad by one of the few countries to have been born 
with democratic propensities was as natural as the growing global power distribution 
change was to pushing the US to claim world leadership at the League of Nations. 
Perhaps the two trends were more formally related: Global leadership was transiting from 
purely military determination towards the demonstration of a domestic, “civilized” order 
to ostensibly “less civilized” others; and certainly as a unique form of government, in a 
world filled with colonies and mandates ruled largely by European empires, the US could 
champion the new order. Democratization distinguished the old world from the new. 
Europe’s bottom-up supplement to a top-down appraisal depended on a domestic-
international link. Having acquired democracy though trials and errors across centuries, 
West European countries knew of no other way for democracy to be established than 
fidgeting with democratization procedures. Regime-change was not only not an option 
  12since it was a policy approach of the strong, but also an illegitimate democratic action 
since it involved military intervention, which, a long line of philosophers from Dunn’s 
second coming, such as Immanuel Kant through his 1795 Perpetual Peace,
27 refused to 
associate with democracy: Democracy could accept defensive wars, but not initiate them. 
Here too the relative power factor also proved influential. European countries were not 
interested in seeking global leadership roles, least of all resort to force on the same 
continent or with former colonies. They sought an economic club, had a different 
democratic stripe to demonstrate, and believed it pragmatic to pursue a two-track top-
down, bottom-up approach to fulfill their goals. 
  While regime-change necessitates a functional state immediately, state-building 
must pave the way for nation-building, thus creating a four-stage sequence; but when 
regime-change is peacefully induced, both nation-building and state (re)-building must 
resonate off each other. In exemplifying the former, the United States has paid more 
attention to establishing institutions first, whether in Germany, Japan, Afghanistan, or 
Iraq, leaving for citizens and groups to anchor their activities and expectations on those 
institutions. Similarly, in accenting the latter, the EU’s two-track approach involves 
institutional support for proper policy adjustments and civil society mobilization, since 
the policies must ultimately reflect majority opinion. A closer appraisal suggests top-
down institutional support counts more for membership than the presence of civil society. 
Approaches and Levels of Analysis: 
  As the subject of both top-down and bottom-up approaches, democratization 
distinguishes between levels of analysis, at least implicitly.  Top-down democratization, 
                                                 
27Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, introduced by Nicolas Murray Butler (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 1939); also see Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and world politics,” American 
Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (December 1986):1150-69.   
  13according to Richard Youngs,
28 incorporates the institutions of the state, along with 
political parties, playing a vital role in the aggregation of interests, and one or more levels 
of local government. He calls this the political-institutional sphere within a political 
society. It mirrors the lockean political contract of democracy being by, of, and for the 
few, at least in the initial stages. On the other hand, bottom-up democracy addresses “the 
associational, non-office-seeking activity located in the space between the state and the 
family unit.” This designates the civil society sphere. 
Just as the state can also invoke an international level through the combined 
action of states, or a regional level with a smaller group of like-minded countries, the 
society level includes both multinational and transnational corporations, or corporations 
and non-governmental organizations. While the top-down approach does not prohibit 
society-level groups, less attention is paid to them in democratization tasks; while 
bottom-up approaches remain indifferent to state-level engagements and initiatives, even 
to international organizations, like the UN, they nevertheless adapt well. 
Approaches and levels of analysis need not be cast in stone just as the EU and US 
need not represent polar opposite democratization formulas. In an age with 
unprecedented globalizing forces, and the simultaneous expansion of liberalization 
opening limitless opportunities for private sector enterprises, the top-down and bottom-up 
approaches may face many more parallel actions in the middle than at the top or the 
bottom: non-governmental organizations move in and out, as do corporations, not to 
mention international organizations, tourists, reporters, and lots of others in their 
individual capacities. Yet, the point of initiation remains the key distinction: Whether 
                                                 
28Richard Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 14-5.  
  14institutional imperatives or civil society pressures serve as catalyzers, democratization 
matters. Without the former, the result would be anomie; and without both 
simultaneously, the institution-building and civil society growth may bypass each other, 
creating greater harm. 
When the US began with selected leadership and institutions in Germany, Japan, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq, it was able to determine democratization thresholds, essentially 
stages, to which the subsequent exposure to a consumer culture anchored citizens. That 
Germans and Japanese did better than Afghanis and Iraqis has less to do with the 
democratization formula than the idiosyncratic mix: Germans and Japanese had less to 
worry about ethnic rivalries than Afghanis and Iraqis. Yet, this points precisely to the 
one-size-fits-all democratization problem: cultures have the capacity to adapt, but in 
forcing the pace or streamlining different adaptation rates, the top-down approach risks 
losing legitimacy. Even by successfully adapting to the US, Germany and Japan retained 
their own styles in many arenas and with which they even challenge the US today, 
indicating the propensity of a top-down approach to produce competitors even as 
homogenization takes place. Afghani and Iraqi attempts to do likewise keep being 
undermined by stricter deadlines and an army of democratization scholars constantly 
alarmed when unfolding patterns drift from paradigm expectations (Larry Diamond in 
Iraq is a notable example). 
The EU faces the same one-size-fits-all outcome but with better safeguards. Its 
bottom-up surge faces softer, rather than dramatic, institutional changes at the top, and 
can also reach out to EU institutions incrementally from the very start. In the end, Czechs, 
Poles, Slovaks, and Slovenes, among others, look like streamlined Europeans, as 
  15ethnicity distinctions get toned down (compared to what it was during the Cold War); yet 
another destabilizing force appears, based on economic status. East Germans, for 
example, continue to look like the impoverished East Germans of the Cold War era rather 
than upwardly-mobile or prosperous post-Cold War Germans. Unlike the ethnic-conflicts 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, those between East and West Europeans have been relatively 
dampened; and unlike the US-based top-down approach which comes without any social 
or economic safeguards, the EU has compensatory programs, such as the regional 
development funds, which, though tortuously slow in operationalizing, can be resorted to 
against brewing class-based or income-based differences in transitional countries. 
Pathways in the Literatures: 
  Even though this is a comparative study of EU-US democracy, democratization 
pathways are not always country-specific. A proposed paradigm utilized in Europe does 
not convert it into a European pathway. Pathway proposals seek maximum applicability. 
In that sense, Table 1 plucks out four illustrative pathways.  
TABLE 1: DEMOCRATIZATION PATHWAYS: EU-US COMPARISONS 
 
Youngs’s Pathway: 
 
Liberalize civil society 
↓ 
Liberalize economic spheres (market reforms) 
↓ 
Promote good governance 
(attack corruption) 
 
Fukuyama’s Pathway: 
 
Stability through humanitarian assistance, 
infrastructure rebuilding, and economic 
development 
↓ 
Build self-sustaining economic and political 
institutions necessary for democracy 
Pridham’s Pathway: 
 
 
Inaugurate democratization 
↓ 
Decision to liberalize democracy 
↓ 
Constituent phase 
Paris’s IBL Pathway: 
 
Rebuild institutions: 
(a)  prepare conditions for elections 
(b)  create an electoral system favorable to 
moderate groups 
(c)  develop a stable civil society 
(d)  discourage extremism 
(e)  promote conducive economic policies 
(f)  rebuild effective state institutions 
↓ 
  16Construct liberal structures 
 
 
Both Youngs and Pridham applied their pathways to the EU, Pridham to the US 
as well. Fukuyama’s two-step bottom-up nation-building approach and Roland Paris’s 
institutions-before-liberalization (IBL) top-down, state-building post-conflict paradigm, 
offer alternate gleanings, the former carrying a nation-building, thus bottom-up bias, 
reminiscent of the EU, the latter prototypically US. 
One notices both the EU and US depicting half-way positions. While the EU 
embracing the bottom-up rousseauvian approach, without making it the only element of 
any democratization strategy, the US accents the top-down lockean approach, without 
abandoning bottom-up possibilities nor incorporating them into the formal processes. 
When push comes to shove, the US would much rather adopt the top-down approach 
while the EU does not have a choice since streamlining EU policies can only be 
supervised from the top by the EU while bottom-up forces remain intrinsic EU agents of 
democratization given the way the EU consciously seeks devolution and promotes rural 
or regional development plans.
29 Whereas the EU begins with forces already on the 
ground, that is, networks of extant relations, the US prefers the drawing board as its 
starting point, that is, starting from scratch--both reflecting their own historical 
experiences, the European by echoing the long and arduous transitions from authoritarian 
rule to democracy, the US by resonating how its own Founding Fathers constructed a 
quick constitution for a born-free country, essentially building a new regime rather than 
adapting to an old one. 
                                                 
29On the EU’s top-down policy approach, see Martis Brusis, “The instrumental use of European 
Union conditionality:regionalization in the Czech Republic and Slovakia,” East Europe Politics and 
Societies 19, no. 2 (Spring 2005):291-316.  
  17Expectations were matched by concrete developments. Youngs goes on to show 
how the EU strategy was applied to East Europe in the 1980s. Even though the US first 
blew the whistle on democratizing East Europe through President Carter’s human rights 
comments in the late-1970s, the EU played a more dominant role and exerted greater 
long-term influence over East European countries. That is not to say East European 
sentiments belong hook, line, and sinker in the EU camp, since the “new Europe” US 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld spoke about during the 2003 Iraq war prelude seems 
to give its heart to the US as much as keep its feet in Europe. However, the road to EU 
membership prevailed then, even as it does today, in determining where East European 
countries must finally stand, illustrating (a) how EU’s democratization sees the US as a 
challenger; and (b) the quid pro quo policy-linking democratization processes. 
  Similarly for the United States, whose drawing-board approach suited the 
transformation of totalitarian Germany and Japan into democracies after World War II, 
much as it suits Afghanistan and Iraq today. True, the United States could not dislodge, 
not instantly at any rate, kereitsu patterns of interest intermediation in Japan or 
Germany’s close business-government social policy collaboration,
30   but the 
transformation was distinct where it mattered the most: in the form of government, and 
thereby the democratization pathway taken. By this time the US drawing board was 
shifting from the ideal to the practical, but as Afghanistan, Iraq, and other cases show, the 
practical was defined through US experiences, not Afghani or Iraqi.  
Woodrow Wilson’s intention to “make the world safe for democracy” relied 
heavily and even exclusively on an ideal: self-determination. Although self-determination 
                                                 
30See Jeffrey Garten, The Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany, and the Struggle for Supremacy 
(New York, NY: Times Book, 1992), ch. 4. 
  18is a local and not US-inspired sentiment and expectation, its international enforcer and 
advocate was the US before international organizations adopted it. When self-
determination was replaced as a vehicle towards democracy by anti-communism during 
the Cold War, the vanishing US role as vanguard and enforcer suggested democracy to be 
a variable, not as important as self-determination was in the larger picture. It was 
retrospectively argued to be the ends for which communism had to first be eliminated, if 
necessary by dictators.
31 Yet, when the Cold War ended and the need for dictators in this 
line of thinking dissipated, democratization continued to serve as the ends rather than 
means (to other goals, such as the kantian international law or cosmopolitan law, or 
towards a regional trading organization as the EU), with WMDs and terrorism as the new 
threats needing elimination first. Whereas the US entered World War II in reaction to 
German and Japanese behavior, it also intervened in Afghanistan out of a 9/11 reaction; 
but the pre-emptive Iraqi intervention opened a new standard needing a new rationale. 
Democratization through regime-change provided that rationale.  
  In the final analysis, arguments, theories, and models addressing the EU 
experience hold up better than their US-oriented counterparts; and the critical reason also 
shows vividly: the absence of or dependence on the military. Although military-driven 
democratization worked in Germany and Japan after World War II, as well as in Grenada 
(1983) and Panama (1989), Min Xin Pei and Sara Kasper find these to be the only 
successful cases, out of 17 US-led nation-building intervention,
32 down to the present 
time. Fukuyama’s two-steps were not satisfied in the other 13 cases; and Paris’s argument 
                                                 
31Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics 
(New York, NY: Simon and Schuster for American Enterprise Institute, 1982), esp. 23-52. 
32Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, Lessons From the Past: The American Record on Nation-building, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Briefing Paper # 24, May 2003. 
  19of institution-before-liberalization (IBL) suggests, unless successful military intervention 
occurs, even institutions cannot become functional. On the other side of the Table 1 
ledger, Youngs’s and Pridham’s frameworks remain in tact, not just in European 
experiences, as both testify, also US’s, as Pridham finds. Awakening civil society, 
liberalizing to democratize, and promoting good governance do not need military 
intervention; but even as a soft approach, they worked better than the hard US approach. 
Clearly Youngs’s framework would become irrelevant in Taliban’s Afghanistan and 
Saddam’s Iraq; but the alternate US approach struggles to survive as policy prescription 
and theoretical formulation in both. Driving the argument deeper, Pridham’s framework 
explaining both the EU and US experiences confirms the oddity of including military 
intervention, either on the drawing board or on the ground, if democracy is the goal. 
Instruments of Democratization: 
  For the EU, instruments have been collapsed under the label conditionality, for 
the US through stages and sequences. Two sub-sections address these, while a third 
compares and contrasts. 
EU Conditionality: 
  Central to the discussion of EU instruments is the term conditionality. The 
relevant conditionality, as Elena Fierro informs us, is “the field of development 
cooperation;”
33 and as a legion of Europeanists remind us,
34 it influences European Union 
                                                 
33Elena Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, International 
Studies In Human Rights, vol., 76 (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinis Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), 94, but see 
93-5.  
34Gordon Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Study of Democracy 
Assistance and Political Conditionality  (Houndsmills, Basingtoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave, 2001); Jean 
Grugel, ed, Democracy Without Borders: Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies 
(London: Routledge, 1999); Marc Maresceau and Erwan Lannon, ed., The EU’s Enlargement and 
Mediterranean Strategies: A Comparative Analysis (New York, NY: Palgrave and European Institute, 
  20membership. Though conditionality did not emerge from EU membership criteria, it 
marks some of the most carefully specified criteria and contexts, distinguishing the 
tighter EU usage of the terms to refer to specific instruments from the looser US usage to 
refer to intent and identity instead. 
  Fierro defines the term “to denote the donor’s practice of tying aid to specific 
conditions whereby recipients remain eligible for aid.”
35 Substituting the term donor for 
democratizer helps the definition adjust to the looser US usage of the term. Although the 
EU formalized membership recruitment in 1993 through what is called the Copenhagen 
criteria, even before the collapse of the Iron Curtain, between 1986 and 1989, the EU was 
conditioning aid. The Copenhagen criteria, established essentially for EU membership 
but also offering relevant insights on democratization, were fourfold: The candidate 
country had (a) stabilized institutions guaranteeing democracy; (b) a functioning market 
economically capable of competing within the EU; (c) the capacity to adjust to the goals 
of the political, economic, and monetary union; and (d) an understanding of the EU’s 
capacity to recruit and balance new members in the larger comity.
36  These represent the 
political, economic, membership, and institutional obligations of the new member. 
  As Heather Grabbe points out, these were further “tightened” between 1998 and 
2002: The Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy. 
(PHARE) shifted attention from generic reform and democratization to specific EU 
legislation and policy adjustments; short-term and medium-term goals faced new and 
                                                                                                                                                 
University of Ghent, 2001); Georg Sorensen, Political Conditionality (London: F. Cass, 1993); and Olav 
Stokke, Aid and Political Conditionality (London: F. Cass, 1995).  
35Fierro, op. cit., 94.  
36 From Heather Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization Through 
Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), 10, but see 10-31.  
  21varied political criteria for Slovakia, Estonia, and Latvia; strengthening institutional and 
administrative capacities in banking supervision and financial control; internal market 
reforms in liberalizing capital movements, adopting competition law, and establishing 
anti-trust laws, and more effective border management.
37 Klaudijus Maniokas found 
these to be “stricter than the requirements for applicant countries in previous 
enlargements.”
38 Although he finds conditionalilty forming “the backbone of [EU’s] new 
method,” the tightened rules were added to the 6 “classical principles”: (a) accept the 
acquis communautaire in full; (b) accession negotiations to focus on the practicalities of 
application; (c) membership expansion necessitates new policy instrument creation in 
addition to existing one; (d) admission to EU’s institutions entail more detailed review 
after enlargement; (e) EU prefers candidates having closer relations with each other; and 
(f) enlargement reflects the EU’s desire to externalize external problems and existing 
member states to pursue their own interests. 
  On another track, first the European Community (EC), then the EU, adopted what 
was called democracy promotion (DP). Applied largely in the south, especially northern 
African countries, it began informally with the December 1990 Renovated Mediterranean 
Policy, but culminated in the more formal Euro-Med Partnership (EMP) of November 
1995. As the EMP continued the democratic reform commitment of associational states 
like Morocco and Tunisia, Richard Youngs argues, this democracy promotion goal “was 
driven more strongly by strategic than by commercial considerations.”
39
                                                 
37Grabbe, op. cit., 16.  
38Klaudijus Maniokas, “The method of the European Union’s enlargement to the east:a critical 
appraisal,” Driven to Change: The European Union’s Enlargement Viewed from the East, ed. Antoaneta L. 
Dimitrova (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004), 20, but see 18-21.  
39Youngs, “The European Union and democracy promotion in the Mediterranean:a new or 
disingenuous strategy?” Democratization 9, no. 1 (Spring 2002):44, but see 40-62.  
  22US Stages and Sequences: 
  Just as the EU conditionality transformation was from the general to the specific, 
the US moved through a sequence of distinctive stages. As evident explicitly in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, but implicitly in Germany and Japan, US democratization comes in 
a rapid 4-phase package: (a) bring about the regime change, whether this is in reaction to 
what the regime did, as in Afghanistan, Germany, and Japan, or in pre-emption, as in Iraq; 
(b) establish an interim government by selection to harness the legitimate organs and 
procedures to develop a constitution; (c) shift to a transitional government, elected by the 
people but still screened through US filters, to actually write the constitution, have it 
ratified, and supervise the resultant elections; and (d) announce a democratically elected 
government based on a constitution providing ample rights and freedoms. In both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the entire process was to be completed within 2 years; and 
although the deadlines were not strictly met, delays were not significant. Yet, democracy 
is struggling to plant roots in both. In Germany and Japan, the process took longer since a 
formula did not exist, necessitating more trials and errors. Roots, however, went deeper. 
Again, the different outcomes may be a function of the legitimacy of intervention, the 
domestic ethnic calculus, the increasingly mobilized populations today, thus raising the 
ante of expectations and attracting more spectators, as well as the higher opportunity 
costs, not just of alternatives to democracy but also of a larger democracy market where 
the availability of more models means the ability to shop around. 
  As the only case of pre-emption of the four, Iraq went through an additional phase, 
before the interim government was established: administration by the Iraq Governing 
Council (IGC), selected mostly from exiles, by the US through its newly-created 
  23Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), from April 2003. Unlike the 3 other cases, Iraq’s 
democratization was directly supervised by the occupying army: in the other 3 cases, the 
political and military roles were sufficiently separated as to let democratization flourish 
independently. Along with the supervision came restrictions: the Baathists could not 
participate, the military was totally disbanded, and so forth. Which of these actually 
contributed to Iraq’s democratization failure is hard to isolate, but a number of foregoing 
arguments apply here: top-heavy institutions were created without people using them as 
anchors; bottom-up mobilization initiated, not by the US but by transnational groups 
targeting the US, creating anomie, to say the least, civil war more realistically; an elected 
government marooned from the people, ruling from fortresses, and losing legitimacy; and, 
ironically, a surprisingly coherent democratization formula fulfilled in toto. 
  Afghanistan’s case is not nearly as bad for the obvious reason: It did not go 
through a conjoined military-political democratization initiation. Its government is 
functional, indicating, as in Iraq, the formula is not the source of problems; but symptoms 
of Iraq’s malaise persist in Afghanistan. Without a lengthy military shield, Afghanistan’s 
democratization remains vulnerable. 
  Finally, Germany and Japan made it through for many reasons. First, the strength 
of remorse for having a totalitarian government culminated not in resignation, but 
acceptance of an alternate regime. Second, both had functional economic and political 
infrastructures even after conflict, easing the return to routine and productive lives. Third, 
neither were desperately divided societies, whether ethnically or economically, providing 
a source of unity Afghanistan and Iraq never had. Fourth, since no democratization 
formula existed, trials and errors by the US permitted more relaxed deadlines. Fifth, as 
  24victor, the US was still at war, this time with the communists, and since both Germany 
and Japan were expected to play major Cold War outposts, US commanders were much 
more compassionate than in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the US appeared as the sole 
world power, more arrogant than ever before. 
Comparisons: 
Two broad differences illustrate the transatlantic orientational difference:  treating 
defaulters and conditionality. Both show the US to be more relaxed than the EU. 
The US approach invites more defaults and showed greater flexibility in 
accommodating defaulters than the EU’s, a subtle transatlantic difference with many 
causes. First, EU conditionality applied to formal club membership, but US conditionality 
was to open-ended democracy with no membership criteria. Secondly, though profound, 
regime-change in the EU experience did not involve military intervention, but for the US, 
it did. Third, EU regime-change initiatives were directed at countries at a higher 
developmental threshold than were their US counterparts, thus leaving less margin for 
maneuverability in the former than in the latter. Finally, whereas EU conditionality did 
not intervene with other donor-recipient exchanges, just as these other exchanges did not 
affect EU conditionality, almost all donor-recipient exchanges in the US domain had to 
go through or be channeled by the US. 
  According to Fierro, conditionality may be utilized to push the recipient country 
to adopt a policy it would not have pursued otherwise, or even to encourage or accelerate 
a policy already adopted. Similarly, it can be imposed before or after entering a desired 
relationship, what she calls ex-ante or ex-post. Given such open-endedness, instruments 
could be utilized to impose conditions until democratization is enhanced or acquired, 
  25depending on the country involved, or simply promote democracy without conditions. 
Geofrey Pridham, who utilizes this distinction, sees the US illustrating democracy 
promotion (DP) better than the EU, though the narrow focus of the US just on “electoral 
democracy” does not permit ample comparisons with the wide-ranging EU approach.
40 
Richard Youngs prefers the terms democracy assistance (DA) instead. Describing 
purpose to be “to fund projects aimed at strengthening democratic institutions and 
practices,” he contrasts this “positive engagement” with the “coercive” counterpart of 
political conditionality (PC), defined as “the possibility of trade and aid provisions being 
linked to degrees of political pluralism.”
41
  Behind these orientational differences lie substantive dissimilarities, captured in 
the following sub-sets of this sub-section. 
Tone, Thrust, Temperament: 
  Instruments vary accordingly. Drawing from Youngs’s study, Table 3 compares 
and contrasts positive and coercive instruments for both the EU and the US. While the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty was the first EU attempt to promote human rights, democracy, 
and rule of law within a development framework, the Copenhagen criteria adopted the 
next year set the tone, thrust, and temperament of EU’s approach to democratization. The 
tone was simply to make democracy the pre-condition to all else, particularly 
membership, but as Fierro reminds us, even human rights.
42 It was a fundamental 
analogue to the EU variation of economic liberalism, in itself the heart, mind, and soul of 
trade regionalism. Attention, in turn, was directed at East Europe, though colonial 
                                                 
40Geoffrey Pridham , Designing Democrac EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-
Communist Europe (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 50. 
41Youngs, European Union and Promotion of Democracy, 21.  
42Fierro, op. cit. 118.  
  26legacies also pushed the EU into promoting democracy across parts of Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America. Clearly the end of the Cold War created the opportunity to undertake 
regime-change for both the EU and US; but since the dominant Cold War battlefield was 
“from Sttetin to Trieste,” i.e., the Iron Curtain, West European  had no choice but to take 
the lead with the actual instruments. In particular, West Germany shifted attention almost 
entirely to absorbing East Germans, and since Germany would become the largest 
financial supplier of EU democracy promotion in the 1990s,
43 West Germany’s new 
ostpolitik became the EU’s new priority. Full advantage was taken of the opportunity, 
since the EU invited more new membership applicants than ever before, all from south 
and east Europe. With limited budget, as Youngs calculates, roughly 1% of the EU’s 
development budget, the EU thrust was in the east and south, not elsewhere. Yet, eastern 
and southern European democracy promotion shaped the EU temperament: With hands-
on experience, it became a world leader in monitoring elections, meaning establishing 
criteria where and when needed, and promoting human rights--a far cry from the Cold 
War years when agriculture, monetary policy, and market expansion dominated EU 
headlines and agenda. Although agriculture still consumes half the EU budget, foreign 
and security policy, and with it democracy and human rights--what Allan Rosas dubs the 
Siamese twins”
44--increasingly demand greater attention. The Mediterranean served as an 
unofficial dividing line in the EU vision: Mediterranean African countries would be 
encouraged, but not obligated, to democratize and certainly not with policy leverages as 
with east and south Europe, or towards becoming full-fledged EU members. 
TABLE 3: TYPES OF DEMOCRATIC ENGAGEMENT 
                                                 
43In absolute numbers.  Sweden gave a larger proportion of its GDP. See Youngs, op. cit., 30-34.  
44Allan Rosas and Jan Helgessen, eds., Democracy and Human Rights: Human Rights in a 
Changing East-West Perspective (1990), 17.  
  27Types of Engagement:  EU:  US: 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive engagement (democracy 
promotion or democracy 
assistance): 
*1992 Maastricht Treaty: first to 
introduce promotion of human 
rights, democracy, and rule of 
law within developmental policy 
framework 
*1992: General Affairs Council 
of foreign ministers elevates 
strengthening civil society 
*1993: Copenhagen criteria 
*1994: Initiative for Promotion of 
Democracy and Human Rights 
under European Commission 
management 
  
*Bureau for Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor opened under 
Department of State 
*Center for Democracy and 
Government opened under US 
Assistance for International 
Development (AID) 
*National Endowment for 
Democracy begins coordinating 
funding of political parties and 
elections monitoring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coercive Engagement (political 
conditionality) 
1989: Lomé Convention IV: 
Human Rights respect enshrined, 
but democracy not mentioned and 
legal basis lacking (Substituted 
by Cotonoy Agreement, signed in 
Benin, June 2000)  
*1995: Human Rights and 
Democracy Clause: suspend or 
abrogate contractual relationship 
when democratic  principles 
abused (did not spell out voting 
requirements) 
*June 1997, Amsterdam Treaty: 
Clarified voting requirements; 
since unanimity adopted, 
European Parliament was 
sidelined; called for mixed 
competence (European 
Commission and member states 
 
 
4-phase approach: 
(a) change the regime, usually 
backed up by military means and 
involving conflict; (b) establish 
an interim administration to 
summon a legitimate body to 
initiate shift to constitution-
building; (c) shift to transitional 
government, to some extent 
elected, to prepare the 
constitution, have it ratified, and 
conduct democratic elections; and 
(d) a popularly elected 
government takes over under the 
new constitution 
 
  On the other side of the Atlantic, the end of the Cold War also revitalized the 
search for democracies, but the tone, thrust, and temperament differed. The US 
temperament was driven by global interests in contrast to the EU’s concentric dynamic. 
One critical dimension of the US global orientation was its military pre-eminence: Unlike 
the EU, the US had to calculate military or strategic interests in determining its position 
on democracy. For example, whether it would be worth pushing democracy in Saudi 
Arabia or not when inexpensive oil imports could be seriously threatened at a time of 
market expansion and increased competition. The consequence resonated with the Cold 
War US stand: a soft approach to democracy. It would be prioritized at the rhetorical 
  28level, non-governmental organizations and social groups would be encouraged to 
campaign for it, but few, if any, instruments would be galvanized on a generic basis to 
enhance democracy--somewhat similar structurally to the EU’s African option. 
  Given the long history of US aid being conditioned, one finds the thrust to be 
more indirect than direct: rather than condition democracy, the Cold War tendency was to 
guard against the return to, or embrace of, communism. After the Cold War, new 
agencies took up the drive to promote democracy: the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) in particular, not just through its publications, but also election 
monitoring and institution-building support; the State Department’s creation of the 
Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and the Agency for International 
Development (AID) agency of Center for Democracy and Governance. 
  Unlike the EU, the tone was hot heightened. The US still wanted democracy, but 
only by default: by removing communism, then terrorism. In other words, more funds 
went into the wars against communism and terrorism than in promoting democracy; or to 
put it another way, an anti-communist or anti-terrorist claim carried more weight than a 
claim on behalf of democracy. George W. Bush’s “with us or against us” warning had 
little to do with either protecting or promoting democracy. Since the US was spending as 
much as the EU on these tasks, as Youngs shows,
45 one might argue democratization was 
not a top-priority in either. It was useful, but other interests mattered much more.  
Moreover, the war against terrorism provided opportunities to claim democracy 
leadership. One opportunity came in the form of regime-change. Thus, just as West 
Europeans also sought regime-change in East and South Europe when the Cold War 
ended, the US also embarked upon regime-change worldwide--first in Latin America and 
                                                 
45Youngs, op. cit. 31-2.  
  29through an economic policy approach of liberalism, which produced the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) in the 
decade before 9/11; and especially in “rogue” countries the world over after 9/11 through 
military intervention. Afghanistan paved the way at reinventing governments, and 
thereby ideologies and ultimately political cultures. Iraq followed suit. 
  In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US adopted similar blueprints, heavy on goals 
and deadlines within breathtakingly short time-spans, but soft on actual conditions or 
penalties to be imposed if those deadlines were not kept or the goals were not met. This 
was the transatlantic difference: Whereas democracy remained a variable, intangibly 
anchored, and subordinated to strategic interests for the US, for the EU it had a fixed 
definition, was tangible through the policy requirements, and where pursued, a top 
priority. As Table 3 points out, both countries had the tools, but only the EU utilized 
them purposefully. Why the EU could do what the US would not takes us to another 
difference, this one to do with the rationale: Democracy promotion was necessary for EU 
membership, but fulfilled only strategic US interests; in turn, DP reinforced EU unity and 
identity in and of itself, but fed into other US interests claiming unity and identity, such 
as Bush’s “with or against us” call. 
  Pridham’s comparisons echo these findings from a different angle. His five 
dimensions appraising the scope and mechanisms of DP and DC show this: (a) political-
systemic, addressing political dynamics from a systemic perspective, where the system is 
defined by fulfilling EU membership obligations, for example, set within the European 
Commission context, or the Council of Ministers, and so forth; (b) party-political, 
examining the creation or development of political parties, especially as they align with 
  30European-level counterparts; (c) election monitoring, which is more interested in how 
elections are conducted and if key criteria have been satisfied; (d) political-societal, a 
context capturing civil society dynamics; and (e) political-cultural, which addresses such 
issues as educating the masses and streamlining human rights responses. 
TABLE 4: PRIDHAM’S  MEASUREMENT OF DP AND DC THROUGH SCOPE AND 
 
 MECHANISMS: EU-US COMPARISONS 
 
Dimensions: Top-down:  Bottom-up: 
Political-systemic (local 
government, elite training): 
EU: its own institutions 
US: its own institutions 
EU: PHARE 
Party-political (transnational elite 
socialization): 
EU: transnational party 
cooperation 
EU: activists 
US: activists 
 
Election monitoring: 
EU: Council of Europe 
Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
  
 OSCE 
 
Political-societal (civil society 
issues): 
EU: national governments 
US: national governments 
EU: PHARE, NGOs, private 
foundations 
US private foundations, NGOs 
Political cultural (political 
education, human rights) 
EU: Council of Europe  EU: private foundations 
US: private foundations 
  Source: Geoffrey Pridham, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-
Communist Europe (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 50-1. 
 
  When examined along top-down and bottom-up perspectives for both the EU and 
US, he finds: (a) the US as a DP leader, EU the DC leader; (b) EU showing greater top-
down than bottom-up engagement; (c) top-down orientations in inter-governmental 
agencies like NATO and the World Bank; and (d) transnational agencies like the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) balancing both approaches. 
Placement in a Dynamic Global Context: 
  Pursuing democracy and democratizing can not be the only tasks of any given 
government. Security must be provided, commerce allowed to flow, education be 
imparted, healthcare be maintained, and a host of other tasks constantly demand 
governmental attention. How, then, do the pursuits of democracy and democratization fit 
  31into this busy agenda? Three sub-sections address this by comparing (a) democratization 
checklists; (b) exogenous and endogenous factors; and (c) time thresholds. 
Democratization Checklists: 
  One approach to an answer is to redirect the checklist Albert Somit and Steven A 
Peterson developed from the democratization literature. Meant for a study of specific 
instances of US-driven democratization, its 9 elements can be utilized here for a 
comparative EU-US study. Table 5 illustrates. 
TABLE 5: CHECKLIST FOR SUCCESSFUL NATION-BUILDING: EU-US COMPARISONS 
 
Checklist: EU:  US: 
1. Willingness by democratizing 
country to invest personnel and 
resources: 
Yes, but within limits, especially 
of humans 
Yes, has been fairly open-ended 
2. Willingness to keep military 
and civilian presence: 
Yes over patience, no over 
civilian and military presence 
Yes 
3. Commitment to reduce post-
conflict deaths from combat: 
No examples to rely on; and not 
immediately attractive 
Yes 
4. Appreciation of local culture 
and avoidance of arrogance: 
EU enlargement proceeds very 
frankly on “asymmetrical” basis: 
Mixed report 
5. Restore infrastructure and 
human capital: 
Yes, through its many programs  Yes 
6. Remove from the key positions 
those associated with past regime: 
Not a task diligently pursued  Yes, diligently pursued 
7. Be able to understand deeply 
divided countries reduce chances 
of success: 
Yes, but intervention has been 
economic where this question has 
not been important 
Yes, but largely ignored given the 
reasons for intervention; hope 
that intervention reduces inter-
ethnic divisions 
8. Streamline external and 
internal interests: 
Yes, and emphatically so with 
regards EU 
Not a priority if outside country is 
not the US 
9. Rebuild social, economic, 
political institutions as base for 
liberal reforms: 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
  A first-level analysis of Table 5 finds two critical differences. First, intervention, 
especially military, has not been a EU practice and is not an option the EU is likely to 
pursue, although it is the very essence of US regime-change since many regimes needing 
change are in conflict-ridden countries or inimical to US interests. Second, the subdued 
EU tone to many of the checklist questions contrasts with US enthusiasm. One might 
  32argue the checklist suits the US since it was developed largely with US experiences in 
mind, thus reaffirming US-EU differences. Previous comparative frameworks utilized, 
for example, Youngs’s, also carried a similar EU bias, thus offsetting the checklist US 
bias, and ultimately accentuating EU-US differences. 
  If we turn to the Somit-Peterson checklist for the emergence of democracy in 
targeted countries, we again see contrasts. Table 6 illustrates. Also drawn from US 
experiences, this check-list is more favorably slanted towards the EU. Among the critical 
differences, first, the EU is better able than the US in facilitating democratic practices and 
establishing functional institutions; second, economic development faces more favorable 
circumstances under EU efforts than US, although this may again be a function of the US 
democratizing more difficult countries than the EU; and third, the more obscure EU seeds 
of conflict than in US disguise the ongoing EU membership process. 
TABLE 6: CHECKLIST FOR EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRACY: EU-US COMPARISONS 
Checklist: EU:  US: 
1. Functioning government 
institutions: 
Yes Mixed  report 
2. Internal peace (e.g., no civil 
wars): 
Yes Largely  no 
3. Adequate levels of economic 
development: 
Yes Largely  no 
4. Adequate levels of education:  Yes  Largely no 
5. Existence of basic liberties:  Yes  Largely no 
6. Lack of previous authoritarian 
regime: 
Yes Yes 
7. Pro-democratic  “out-elite”  Yes  Yes 
8. Pro-democracy civic 
dispositions: 
Yes Yes,  but  constrained 
9. Religious conflict is absent:  Yes  Not always 
10. Ethnic, tribal, and racial 
conflict is absent: 
Largely Not  really 
 
Exogenous and Endogenous Factors: 
How do exogenous and external factors fare in both cases? Table 7 lists some 
relevant exogenous and external factors, before comparing and contrasting the two cases. 
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Exogenous and External 
Factors: 
EU: US: 
 
 
 
 
1. Key characteristics of the 
democratization sponsor (EU or 
US): 
 
Multi-membered group; 
democracy is passport to joining 
an economic club; EU 
socialization proceeds at multiple 
levels and over multiple years of 
grooming; membership idea is 
attractive, grooming is tough, and 
end-product is one-size-fits-all 
European  
Single-membered sponsor (US 
Alone); democratization and 
liberalization often proceed 
simultaneously; multiple-level 
process but time-frame usually a 
lot tighter; democratization 
usually without choice, 
adjustment is difficult; and en-
product rarely achieved, 
especially if one-size-fits-all US 
type 
 
 
 
2. How singular is the model 
target countries must follow? 
In satisfying Copenhagen criteria, 
it is very singular: a European 
model devoid of any national or 
statist pattern; in developing 
political structures, target 
countries have many options to 
follow from the many EU 
members 
 
Both in economic and political 
anchors, the US model is heavily 
advocated, creating greater 
singularity (presidential favored 
over prime minister in form of 
government, and so forth) 
 
3. To what extent can other 
external forces contribute to 
target country democratization? 
The door is open, but EU 
membership imposes a sine qua 
non trajectory target countries do 
not which to deviate from or 
subordinate 
The door is open, but through US 
filters, both politically and 
economically (corporations, for 
example) 
 
 
4. Prospects for international 
organizations: 
Mostly welcomed, but if EU has 
counterpart agencies, they get 
preference; with so detailed EU 
grooming, international 
organizations have lesser scope 
for engagement 
 
Washington Consensus 
institutions (IMF, IBRD) very 
welcomed, UN utilized as 
instrument of last resort 
5. Room to diverge from 
democratization sponsors (EU or 
US): 
Yes, as evident in 2003 Iraq war: 
it divided EU membership 
Theoretically yes, but practically 
difficult 
 
  Five dimensions chosen to fill in analytical cracks in the relevant literatures offer 
quite a mouthful of contrasts. Highlighting the key characteristic of the EU and US in 
their democratization pursuits, the first dimension informs us why both enter the game 
with very different baggages and capacities. As a group of several countries, the EU 
cannot impose the styles and patterns of any one country, but it does require, by virtue of 
Article 6(1) of the Treaty of European Union and Article 177(2) of the TEC, democratic 
credentials for membership. By contrast, the US is a single-member democracy sponsor, 
and while the only passport to creating democracy is to have an authoritarian government 
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simultaneously. Progress is more loosely monitored by the US compared to the EU, and 
while both establish thresholds in their pursuits, the EU has been more stringent in 
satisfying them than the US. For example, Afghanistan and Iraq frequently missed 
deadlines in creating constitutions, but the US was more flexible than the EU would have 
been to a candidate country not fulfilling any particular criterion. 
  EU democratization necessitates the candidate country to socialize with a variety 
of EU institutions and policy networks, something the US encourages but does not 
require. Consequently, over the many years of socializing, EU candidate members 
acquire a europeanness, in spite of the occasional bouts of frustration from not fully 
satisfying any given membership criterion; but the US does not normally allow a long 
leash of time, and though an americanness is desired, it is usually not required nor 
obtained. Germany and Japan continue to retain idiosyncratic practices, such as in interest 
intermediation over policy-making; while Afghanistan and Iraq, if a first-sight is any 
indicator, are quite unlikely to mirror the US in many areas. 
  Against the background of this closer EU-identity imperative and the more 
flexible US counterpart, the second dimension asks if the target countries must follow 
their patrons as a model, and how singular is the patron itself. In satisfying the 
Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries have no choice but to follow the singular EU 
model, but fortunately for them, this model is the net product of several members, not any 
one of them in particular. By contrast, the US model is singular, and the target country is 
heavily encouraged to follow US preferences over both political and economic policies. 
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convergence is a requirement. 
  The third dimension explores other external forces, whether they can chip in to 
the democratizing process, and what consequences may ensue. Both the EU and US 
invite other actors to contribute, and both also have their own filtration systems. Since the 
EU is interested in democratization to determine membership, no matter how many other 
external actors engaged, the bottom-line remains a variety of EU preferences those other 
actors can do nothing about. While the US does not impose such a sine qua non trajectory, 
it is cognizant of the nature and extent of participation of other actors, be they non-
governmental organizations, opportunity-seeking corporations, or a variety of 
international organizations.  
In fact, the fourth dimension treats these international organizations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (World Bank), and the UN, separately. They are all welcome by both the 
EU and US, but they both have implicit or explicit qualifiers. For example, EU target 
countries typically go through such a lengthy grooming period, there is not much more 
these organizations can do, unless an emergency arises. Even in such instances, if the EU 
has counterpart arrangements, these are forwarded in lieu of the IMF, World Bank, or the 
UN. For the US, Washington Consensus institutions like the IMF and the World Bank 
normally do not pose any problems, and often go hand-in-hand with US development or 
democratization efforts. Once in a while, the UN becomes a problem due to its wider 
audience and membership, which the US normally tries to avoid. 
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preferences from the sponsoring agency, the EU or US. This seems to be more possible in 
the EU, in part owing to its large membership, than with the US. Although not prohibited 
by the US, divergences in any one area could result in reduced rewards or withheld 
promises in another, creating a disincentive to defect. 
Time Thresholds: 
Given the contrasting performances of Germany and Japan, on the one hand, and 
Afghanistan and Iraq, on the other, why has US pursuits of democratization not produced 
the uniform results the EU pursuit has: Table 8 addresses this by creating time thresholds 
as comparative dimensions. 
TABLE 8: TIME THRESHOLDS & EU-US DEMOCRATIZATION RESPONSES 
 
Time-thresholds: EU:  US: 
 
1. Pre-World War II: “making the 
world safe for democracy” with 
self  determination as instrument 
No EU existed, but many 
European countries with colonies 
rejected self-determination; and 
many were undergoing regime-
change themselves 
As much a US rhetoric as reality: 
first instances of regime-change 
started (the Philippines, Cuba, 
Panama, Nicaragua, and Haiti,in 
that order) 
2. Cold War era (1945-1986): 
“making the world safe for 
democracy” by quashing 
communism: 
US security umbrella helped 
consolidate fledgling 
democracies, institutionalize 
liberalism, and initiate regional 
identity 
Friendly dictators fighting 
communism more valuable than 
democracy-seeking groups (Iran, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Indonesia,  Turkey, Egypt) 
 
 
3. Post-Cold War era: “making 
the world safe for democracy” by 
promoting democracy: 
 
 
East and South European 
opportunity: to democratize, 
expand membership, and seek 
role as democratization leader 
East European opportunity 
extended to Soviet-successor 
states and across Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America: greater 
emphasis on liberalization than 
democratization; NGOs growth to  
spearhead democracy abroad 
 
 
 
4. Post-9/11 (2001-):“making the 
world safe for democracy” by 
eliminating terrorism: 
 
 
Moment of consolidating East 
and South European membership; 
champion democracy elsewhere 
through electoral monitors 
Regime-change given more 
urgent billing, resort to military 
intervention elevated as 
instrument; democratization 
rhetorical headline, but 
subordinated to stamping 
terrorism out 
 
  Four dimensions show four interpretations of the wilsonian maxim of making the 
world safe for democracy. The first is identified in terms of self-determination, advocated 
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popular position to adopt as well as lodge among the fundamentals of the emerging 
international organization, the League of Nations. It was a time when the US could have 
become what it did in the fourth time-threshold: the sole world power. Interestingly in 
this fourth phase, when the maxim was interpreted in terms of ridding the world of 
terrorism, the US stood aloof, and at times, against  the European current, not just in 
terms of democratization, but over other issues as well. Three features made this fourth 
phase an entirely different era: there was no need to create an international organization, 
and the dominant one existing, the UN, stood as handicapped in promoting democracy as 
the League of Nations was empowered to seek it (through self-determination and 
mandates); the US had a democratization game plan, which it didn’t in Wilson’s time, as 
well as domestic support to implement it; and there now existed a competitive thrust to 
pursuing democracy, with the EU promoting the same goal by other means. 
  In between, as the campaign to spread democracy waned during the Cold War, 
independent democracy movements in southern and eastern Europe, in what Samuel P. 
Huntington and others call the third democratic wave, brought the European Community 
on to the democratization stage. The US was left to catch-up for at least two reasons: Its 
authoritarian Cold War clients could not be automatically strung out to dry when the Cold 
War ended; and, led by West Germany, European countries began thrashing out the nuts 
and bolts of democratization more vividly, even if the efforts primarily sought a 
facilitative economic order for EU membership. 
  The rest became democracy history. Democracy came out of the development 
planning cocoon, demanding its own independent plans, which, once initiated by the EU, 
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their own conditions or thresholds and confront other countries whether they wanted it or 
not, were ready for it or not. As a conglomeration of countries with limited available 
resources, the EU would not take on this campaign at the global level, except in rhetoric; 
but the United States was ready, willing, and able to do so, at the least to compensate for 
a historical negligence, at most to remodel the world in its own image. Unlike the war 
against communism when democracy could be left to languish on the back-burner, in the 
war against terrorism, democracy cannot but be given greater glow. 
  In the final analysis, both the EU and the US have their own distinctive 
democracy orientations and democratization formulas, but one seemingly echoes off the 
other: Without the US-driven Cold War, who knows what might have happened, and 
when, to East European democratization; and without the West European interest in East 
European democratization, who knows if the US would have even mustered a 
democratization formula. Both could end up in the same ballpark and with similar guises 
of democracy, but more likely they will give democracy their own different stripes. 
Conclusions: 
  A survey of what democracy broadly means, how democratization is spelled out, 
why certain instruments are used, and where democracy lies in the larger compass of 
domestic and external interests point to two different transatlantic protagonists. Both the 
US and West European countries have been shifting their historical orientations, the 
former from a relative bottom-up approach towards a top-down position, the latter 
shifting towards the bottom-up without abandoning the top-down. Where they belong in 
the global context might have a lot to do with this shift: World leadership demands a 
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about the task while basking in the shadows of the leader; and so it was, the US adopting 
a more decisive top-down approach the more it behaved like a world leader, and the EU 
increasingly creating quid pro quo democratic opportunities the more robust its regional 
organization became. In between the definition and the larger picture, the two sides 
implemented different strategies utilizing different instruments: In part as a world leader, 
the US could make democracy the ends of policy alignments, the EU the means; in other 
words, a looser US definition of democracy permitted less rigid democratization 
beginning no less on the battlefield, but a tighter EU counterpart narrowed the processes 
to specific instruments. In neither is democracy made a vital interest, since the US ranks a 
favorable global alignment much higher as does the EU economic integration. Yet, by 
simultaneously championing democracy, both lock themselves and other countries in. 
  The 4-stage US approach may go globally farther than the multidimensional EU 
counterpart, but the EU approach may sink regionally deeper than the US formula: Not 
many countries can fulfill the EU criteria, and even if they do, EU membership or 
privileged trading arrangements, remain prohibitive. The option to defect to the other side, 
that is, the US, opens up, and on less stringent terms; and even though many countries 
find the spotty US democracy record attractive, very few, if any, would volunteer to 
begin with a military conflict. Democracy’s multiplying facets is but a reaction to the 
many country-cultures it must adapt to. Promoting it necessitates flexibility. Though the 
US shows this characteristic more than the EU, reactions and criteria flexibility no longer 
seem sufficient to explain democracy. 
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